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publications
Sovereign Debt and CDS - A Welfare Analysis
This paper presents a model of government borrowing, where the lender can insure himself against government default by signing a contract with a third party. Under quite general specifications I characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium and compare it to the second-best and an economy where no such insurance is available. I find that under risk-neutrality of all parties the lender always chooses the efficient level of credit insurance and credit insurance is thus welfare improving compared to an economy without credit insurance. This is however no longer true in the case of risk-aversion of the government. I provide precise conditions under which an economy with credit insurance is strictly pareto-inferior compared to an economy without credit insurance.
Insider Trading and Communication among Peers
This paper investigates how insiders in financial markets might profit from sharing information with their peers. I develop a three-period model based on the seminal Kyle (1985) paper on strategic insider trading, where in contrast to the previous literature, informed traders can share information about the fundamental value of the asset with their peers without disclosing it publicly to the whole market. I show that in such environment it can be ex-ante profitable for a trader to share some of its information with others. The intuition is the following: By sending information with some noise, the trader introduces noise into the economy and only he knows the precise realization of. This helps him to better interpret prices and he thus learns more about information of other traders compared to the market maker and thus makes a more profitable trade in the last period.
Blockholder Influence
Blockholder influence has attracted recent interest, not only in the context of corporate boards but also in the context of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). I analyze a model of project choice with dispersed information. I focus on the question whether a blockholder should delegate control to a set of delegates. I assume that agents preferences are not aligned, in the sense that delegates derive private benefits from the acceptance of the proposal while the blockholder derives benefits from the rejection of the proposal. The blockholder chooses composition of the board between delegates and direct representatives of her own interests. I find that when private interests are low, or signals are imprecise there can be multiple equilibria. The most preferred equilibrium for the blockholder is the one with minimum meaningful delegation. This equilibrium also turns out to be the second best and in particular, the equilibrium value of the firm is higher compared to full delegation. This gives rise to a blockholder premium. Furthermore, I solve the information acquisition problem of the committee in closed form.
talks
Talk 1 on Relevant Topic in Your Field
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Tutorial 1 on Relevant Topic in Your Field
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Talk 2 on Relevant Topic in Your Field
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Conference Proceeding talk 3 on Relevant Topic in Your Field
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teaching
Macroeconomics II
PhD course, Teaching Assistant, European University Institute, 2012
Intermediate Microeconomics
Undergraduate course, Teaching Assistant, New York University, 2013
Intermediate Microeconomics
MSc course, Teaching Assistant, John Hopkins University SAIS, 2015
Introduction To Project Valuation
MSc course, Lead Instructor, Imperial College London, 2021